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 Modelling Organisational Vicarious Liability  
Christian Witting* 
 
Abstract: This article identifies two paradigms of vicarious liability. One is an established 
paradigm of ‘liberal agency’ found in cases where owner-managers ‘act through’ workers, 
with whom they have personal relations, in undertaking work tasks. The second paradigm is 
found in cases concerning bureaucratic organisations, which are characterised by chains of 
command and variegated decision-making procedures. Courts have grounded organisational 
responsibility in features such as structure, hierarchy, and control, which this article uses to 
construct a model of the ‘deterrable organisation’. The deterrable organisation has important 
capacities to effect change in behaviour that courts rely upon in order to prevent worker 
wrongdoing. The article tests the viability of the model against the empirical literature and 
argues that courts could improve outcomes by a more targeted use of powers to award 
remedies.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, UK law on vicarious liability has undergone rapid development. Much 
academic commentary about this development has been negative in tenor. Concerns have 
been raised that the doctrine’s scope has become uncertain and that its application has 
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resulted in bad decisions.1 Although certainty might be a necessary casualty of changing laws, 
an enduring worry about vicarious liability is that the uncertainty surrounding the doctrine 
reflects the absence of proper justifications for it.2 Of course, it is clear that the doctrine 
allocates responsibility for worker wrongs in order to compensate tort claimants and that 
compensated claimants are likely to feel a sense of vindication. Academic commentators have 
few gripes about the pursuit of such aims. However, tort law is ‘two-sided’3 in nature so that 
reasoning about liability rules must comprehend the position not only of claimants but of 
defendants as well. This has been the root problem in justifying vicarious liability because the 
reasons for its imposition upon employers have failed to convince.  
 
This article argues that, while a liberal notion of agency provides good justification for 
the vicarious liability of businesses operated by owner-managers who have personal relations 
with workers and of other organisations with analogous structures, it falls short in relation to 
medium- and large-size organisations. These ‘bureaucratic’ organisations feature multiple 
levels of management, ‘chains of command’, and variegated decision-making procedures. 
Senior management directives imposed on workers, without doubt, conclusively establish the 
existence of ‘authority’, but authority becomes more difficult to prove when decision-making 
is devolved and workers are imbued with decision-making discretion. Of course, scholars and 
judges have attempted to characterise the vicarious liability of bureaucratic organisations as 
a form of enterprise liability. This entails the imposition of liability upon organisations 
                                                     
1 Eg, P Giliker, ‘Analysing Institutional Liability for Child Sexual Abuse in England and Wales and Australia: 
Vicarious Liability, Non-Delegable Duties and Statutory Intervention’ (2018) 77 CLJ 506, 516, 532 and 534. 
2 See J Goudkamp, ‘Case Comment: Various Claimants v Barclays Bank Plc’ [2017] JPIL C194, C196-7.  
3 Eg, P Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Oxford: Hart, 2002), p 99.  
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undertaking risky business activities for their own benefit, and from which it is deemed ‘fair’ 
to exact compensation for injuries. However, enterprise liability explains only a sub-set of 
cases. It suffers from the substantial flaws of being inapplicable to non-profit employers, such 
as public authorities and charities, and, when viewed as a ‘licence fee’ upon organisational 
activities, of actually tolerating employee wrongdoing.4  
 
This article isolates elements of judicial reasoning found in modern cases of 
organisational vicarious liability. From factors including structure, hierarchy, and control, it 
constructs a model of the ‘deterrable organisation’5 and demonstrates how courts might 
achieve reform of worker behaviour through the imposition of vicarious liability. Three 
themes inform the model. The first relates to strict liability, which is liability regardless of 
fault. The imposition of strict liability creates incentives to be proactive in setting proper 
standards of conduct. The second theme is about ‘delegation’. Because vicarious liability does 
not require proof of organisational fault, it pushes responsibility for investigations of worker 
wrongdoing, and for reform of conduct, onto organisations themselves. This structuring of 
responsibility mirrors decentred regulatory practices. The third theme relates to 
‘deterrability’, which arises from organisational attributes that courts rely upon in order to 
reduce the frequency and seriousness of worker wrongdoing. The model hypothesises that 
organisations are deterrable because they can act on threats of legal liability by planning 
                                                     
4 Eg, JCP Goldberg and BC Zipursky, ‘The Strict Liability in Fault and the Fault in Strict Liability’ (2016) 85 Fordham 
LR 743, 763-4.   
5 This phrase is used in LM Friedman, Impact: How Law Affects Behavior (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2016), p 134. 
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activities, devising proper standards of conduct which override individual discretion, and 
compelling workers to adhere to them. 
 
Having set out a model of the deterrable organisation, the article turns to consider 
scholarly concerns about deterrence reasoning, the ostensible problems being that subjects 
of law are not well-informed about legal rules, that they ignore incentives to comply, and that 
those incentives are dampened by liability insurance. Although these concerns turn out to be 
of lesser relevance to medium- and large-size organisations, the article assesses potential 
weaknesses in the deterrable organisation model and acknowledges ways in which the reform 
of worker behaviour might be frustrated. The conclusion is that, although organisations are 
deterrable, there will be insufficient deterrence unless steps are taken to reinforce the 
operation of the model by a more targeted use of powers to award remedies.   
 
In constructing its argument, this article adopts a Dworkinian interpretive approach. 
This widely-adopted approach to theorising about private law6 encompasses three stages. At 
the pre-interpretive stage, we identify ‘the rules and standards taken to provide the tentative 
content of the practice’ in question.7 At the interpretive stage, the ‘interpreter settles on 
some general justification for the main elements of the practice identified at the pre-
interpretive stage’.8 This involves putting forward an ‘interpretive proposal’, which attempts 
to provide the best possible way of seeing the rules and standards. This way of seeing, or 
justification, ‘need not fit every aspect or feature of the’ rules and standards, but must fit 
                                                     
6 See, eg, SA Smith, Contract Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p 5.  
7 R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Oxford: Hart, 1998), pp 65-6. 
8 Ibid p 66. 
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them sufficiently so as not to constitute the invention of something new and unintended.9 If 
satisfactory, the interpretive proposal should help us to understand the law better.10 At the 
post-interpretive stage, the interpreter ‘adjusts’ her sense of what the rules and standards 
really require ‘so as better to serve the justification’ which has been proposed and assist in 
making the rules or standards work better.11  
 
2. LIBERAL AGENCY12 
Our discussion commences with the first paradigm of vicarious liability. Prior to the late 17th 
century, English courts imposed vicarious liability on the basis of what the master 
‘commanded’ the servant to do. In modernising the law, Lord Holt insisted upon the presence 
of an agency relationship between master and servant but recognised, for example in 
Turberville v Stamp, that implied authority would be sufficient to support liability.13 In this, he 
is said to have introduced a rule of responsibility based upon ‘convenience and public 
policy’.14 Within a century, vicarious liability rules became focussed upon the key concept of 
the ‘relationship of employment’.15 Even so, the ‘scope of employment’ was determined by 
examining what activities the employee was authorised to engage in.  
 
                                                     
9 Ibid pp 52 and 66.  
10 Smith, above n6, p 5. 
11 Dworkin, above n7, pp 57 and 70. 
12 The term derives from A Gray, Vicarious Liability: Critique and Reform (Oxford: Hart, 2018), p 9. 
12 TFT Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 5th edn, 1956), p 166. 
13 (1697) 1 Ld Raym 264, 264-5; 91 ER 1072, 1073.  
14 Plucknett, above n12, p 476. 
15 Eg, M’Manus v Crickett (1800) 1 East 106; 102 ER 43.  
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It remains necessary to undertake this inquiry in classical vicarious liability cases because 
the mere fact of employment says nothing about whether the employee was acting on 
instruction or was off on a frolic. The normatively salient link between the owner-manager 
and the employee, where an act of the latter causes harm to the claimant, is the authorised 
activity.16 The concept of agency used is not ‘technical’ in the sense of being premised upon 
agreement to act and specification of the agent’s area of authority. It turns, instead, on the 
idea of one person ‘acting through another’ in order to fulfil her purposes.17 
 
In recent times, judges have moved away from the language of the older authorities, in 
order to accommodate a widening of ‘employer’ responsibilities so as to include activities 
undertaken by non-employees. Courts consider the worker’s ‘field of activities’ and their 
connection to the commission of the tort.18 However, extended consideration of this 
approach in Bellman v Northampton Recruitment Ltd19 reveals two important things. First, 
the ‘field of activities’ concept inevitably requires reference to issues of authority, because 
one can discern the ‘field’ only according to what the employer was intending to accomplish 
by engagement of workers. Second, the relevant notion of authority extends beyond both 
actual and ostensible authority, so that it comports with the traditional, liberal notion of 
agency.  
 
                                                     
16 The centrality of agency reasoning is championed by Gray, n12, pp x, 50 and 187, and accepted here as the 
most cogent justification of classical law. Cf C Beuermann, ‘Tort law in the employment relationship: A response 
to the potential abuse of an employer’s authority’ (2014) 21 TLJ 169. 
17 Eg, Morgans v Launchbury [1973] AC 127, 135.  
18 Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] AC 677, [44]-[45](‘Mohamud’).  
19 [2019] IRLR 66, esp [17]-[18], [22] and [24].  
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The potential remains for the vicarious liability of small companies,20 small 
partnerships,21 and individual employers on the basis of liberal agency where there are 
personal relations between relevant parties. The justification applies, for example, where a 
worker commits a tort with a sufficient connection to a family plumbing business’s field of 
activities because its manager has set the worker on a particular course,22 perhaps wearing a 
distinctive uniform, driving a logo-emblazoned van,23 and acting with the owner-manager’s 
attitudes and values.24 But the owner-manager’s actual grant of authority is not definitive of 
the extent of the business’s vicarious liability because the presence of some minimal degree 
of authority in the worker is likely to create expectations among counterparties as to 
standards to be upheld and responsibilities undertaken, and because the owner-manager 
must be assumed to understand the tendencies of workers to take shortcuts and exploit 
opportunities for self-gratification.  
 
Although Gray is right to explain vicarious liability by reference to ideas of liberal agency, 
he does not see modern cases of responsibility for the acts of intentional wrongdoers, such 
as those involving sexual abuse of children, as being consonant with the doctrine’s agential 
foundations.25 This is because the worker does not act both for the employer’s purposes and 
benefit.26 Undoubtedly, this is true – so far as it goes. But Gray argues, further, that employers 
                                                     
20 Eg, Bellman v Northampton Recruitment Ltd [2019] IRLR 66.  
21 See Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2003] 2 AC 366. 
22 PS Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (London: Butterworths, 1967), p 13. 
23 See Hollis v Vabu (2001) 207 CLR 21. 
24 C Hodges, Law and Corporate Behaviour (Oxford: Hart, 2015), p 38. See also MJ Hatch, Organization Theory: 
Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Views (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2013), p 103. 
25 Gray, above n12, p 172. 
26 Ibid pp 159 and 172.  
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ought not to be made responsible for the commission of torts in such circumstances. 
Consistent with corrective justice values, he propounds the view that tort law ought to be 
confined either to cases of fault-based liability or those in which the employer is morally 
blameworthy for the commission of employee wrongs.27 At least a couple of objections arise. 
First, the argument ignores tort law’s two-sided nature, which necessitates that judges 
consider both agent actions and the interests of persons harmed by those actions in coming 
to decisions about liability. In tort cases, ‘the interests of victims are given at least as much 
weight as those of agents’.28 Second, Gray clings to notions of fault developed in a simpler 
age and seeks to apply them not only to cases involving small organisations characterised by 
personal relations with workers, but to cases involving bureaucratic organisations too. In 
treating these cases alike, he elides important differences between them that ground the case 
for a second paradigm of vicarious liability. 
 
3. THE ORGANISATIONAL TURN IN THE CASE LAW 
The classical rules of vicarious liability were sufficient in times agricultural production, small-
scale business, and size-limited partnerships because owner-managers interacted directly 
with workers. Then came the industrial revolution and the growth of bureaucratic 
organisations. New justifications for vicarious liability were required. Until Various Claimants 
v Catholic Child Welfare Society (CCWS),29 the normatively important features of 
organisational vicarious liability remained unclear. The embrace of a new kind of vicarious 
liability in CCWS reflects the transition to a corporatised world characterised by collective 
                                                     
27 Ibid pp 159 and 178.  
28 Ibid p 99. 
29 [2013] 2 AC 1. 
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action, continuous planning and operations to scale.30 The larger size and scale of industrial, 
commercial, and governmental activities has led to the growth of multi-level management, 
featuring the indirect communication of decisions down the hierarchy of authority and/or 
devolved decision-making. In medium- and large-size organisations, directors and senior 
managers interact primarily with middle-managers and no longer see or know anything of 
individual workers.31 Proving authority to act is complicated by the sharing of tasks among 
workers and by the existence of areas of decision-making discretion. Workers imbued with 
decision-making discretion might need to determine what to do after reconciling direct 
requests, company policies, past practices, customer expectations, and so on. In the 
circumstances, assignment of liability for wrongdoing on simple agency grounds frequently is 
‘inadequate because most injuries result from a complicated combination of acts by various 
agents’ or from the exercise of discretion.32 The difficulty in proving agency is greatest when 
worker actions diverge from the norm and are characterised by courts as wrongs.  
 
The advent of bureaucratic organisations is not the only change in the world of work 
that has impacted upon vicarious liability rules. For decades, employers have been 
outsourcing work when this either is more efficiently undertaken by suppliers of specialist 
inputs or else helps to avoid unwanted employment responsibilities.33  
 
                                                     
30 See AD Chandler, Scale and Scope (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), ch 2; GC Keating, ‘The 
Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability’ (1997) 95 Mich LR 1266, 1267. 
31 H Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1979), pp 242-4. 
32 LA Kornhauser, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents’ 
(1982) 70 Cal LR 1345, 1350.  
33 Eg, P Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p 82. 
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Reflecting these structural changes, the modern law of vicarious liability has become 
more capacious through: extension of liability to persons ‘akin to employees’ and then to 
certain independent contractors34 (explaining use of the term ‘worker’ in this article);35  the 
development of a ‘sufficient connection’ test36 which extends responsibility for the 
commission of torts beyond cases of authorisation to encompass unauthorised acts occurring 
in broadly-conceived ‘fields of activity’;37 and the adoption of rationales for liability aimed at 
addressing new organisational practices.38 These changes have been accompanied by a 
greater focus on organisational capacities to coordinate work and constrain worker conduct. 
The result is a more complete type of organisational responsibility. But the question is how 
this is to be justified.  
 
This article aims both to model and critique organisational vicarious liability. In doing 
so, it focusses on how courts have justified modern developments. Their decisions have 
turned upon the following elements: First, courts have been right to observe that most 
defendants are organisations.39 They include not just companies, but government 
departments, statutory authorities, partnerships, non-profit organisations, and 
unincorporated associations. Courts have been willing to impose liability upon 
unincorporated associations where they act ‘like’ corporate bodies,40 as was the case with 
                                                     
34 Eg, Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2013] 2 AC 1 (‘CCWS’).  
35 ‘Worker’ is a term encompassing persons at all levels within organisations but, for expositional purposes, a 
contrast is drawn frequently between ‘managers’ and ‘workers’.  
36 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215. 
37 Bellman v Northampton Recruitment Ltd [2019] IRLR 66, [17].  
38 Eg, CCWS [2013] 2 AC 1; Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council [2018] AC 355 (‘Armes’). 
39 CCWS [2013] 2 AC 1, [34]. 
40 Ibid [34].  
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the Institute of Brothers in CCWS.41 Second, organisations are characterised by hierarchical 
relationships between senior managers and individual workers.42 Thus, in CCWS the ‘brothers 
were subject to … directions as to their employment [with third party schools] and the general 
supervision of the Provincial, their superior within that hierarchical structure’.43 Third, these 
hierarchical relationships provide organisations with the ability to exercise control over 
work.44 More specifically, they exercise ‘managerial control’,45 which facilitates measures to 
discipline workers and/or reform the ways in which they undertake work. For example, in 
Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council the local authority retained statutory powers of 
inspection, supervision, and removal with respect to children residing with approved foster 
parents.46 Fourth, courts have noted that workers frequently are an ‘integral part’ of 
organisations while undertaking tasks that result in wrongdoing.47  
 
Beyond these elements of organisation, courts rely also upon reasoning that is more 
philosophical in nature. Two major theories have attracted their attention. First, enterprise 
liability. Using their own terminology, courts find it significant that the organisation or 
‘enterprise’ conducts a ‘business’ activity and ‘benefits’ from work undertaken. The benefit 
need not be financial in nature but can comprise anything of value to the organisation. Thus, 
in Cox v Ministry of Justice the prisoners’ work in the kitchen ‘form[ed] part of the operation 
                                                     
41 Ibid [89]. 
42 Ibid [2]. 
43 Ibid [89]. 
44 Eg, Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] AC 660, [21].   
45 Mutua v Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2012] EWHC 2678 (QB), 82. 
46 [2018] AC 355, [10].  
47 Eg, Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] AC 660, [22]-[24]. 
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of the prison, and [was] of direct and immediate benefit to the prison service itself’.48 The 
problem is that the benefit can be obtained only through the creation or exacerbation of risks 
to others.49 As such, it is ‘fair’ to impose liability on the organisation for the negative 
consequences of its activities.50  
 
Second, courts assert that vicarious liability is imposed upon organisations because they 
can ‘do something’ about workers conduct.51 They embrace a deterrence rationale based on 
judicial ‘power to order defendants to pay damages’ and the consequent ability to ‘deter the 
defendant and other similarly situated actors from engaging in conduct they deem 
undesirable; at least insofar as the threat of damages awards affects actors’ decisions’.52 For 
example, Sir Anthony Clarke MR in Gravil v Carroll stated that the imposition of vicarious 
liability upon a rugby club for player wrongdoing was justified by ‘deterrence of the club by 
bringing home the liability … so as to prevent or minimise the risk of foul play in the future’.53 
His Lordship discussed specific actions that the club could take to this end. While in other 
cases deterrence is not referred to by name, it is the substantive explanation for what courts 
seek to achieve. Thus, in Various Claimants v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc, Justice Langstaff 
(at first instance) noted that an employer could design preventative systems that workers 
                                                     
48 Ibid [34]. 
49 CCWS [2013] 2 AC 1, [87].  
50 Armes [2018] AC 355, [61].  
51 Ibid [67].  
52 JCP Goldberg, ‘Twentieth-Century Tort Theory’ (2003) 91 Geo LJ 513, 525. 
53 [2008] EWCA Civ 689, [26].  
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could be directed to observe.54 Such statements tell us that courts are not indifferent to the 
impact of vicarious liability. It is reform of worker behaviour that they desire.  
 
4. EXISTING EXPLANATIONS OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
In ‘interpreting’ judicial reasoning, Dworkin urges us to search for the best way to justify it, to 
see it in its ‘best light’. The question arises whether enterprise liability presents organisational 
vicarious liability in its best light.55 Enterprise liability has a respectable pedigree,56 having 
been developed in the scholarly literature during the first half of the twentieth-century, and 
been used as a justification for US law on products liability and vicarious liability.57 It is 
concerned with ensuring that organisational defendants, such as manufacturers and large 
firms, cannot escape responsibility for injuries caused by profit-making activities. Beyond this 
basic idea, different branches of the theory encompass different – and partly conflicting – 
sub-goals, the main ones being: the spreading of costs of injury to consumers in the sale of 
goods and/or to insurers via higher premiums;58 the internalisation by organisations of the 
costs of their activities, so as to ensure that the most appropriate (not excessive or damaging) 
                                                     
54 [2018] EMLR 12, [184] (affirmed [2018] EWCA Civ 2339). 
55 See S Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law: Categories and Concepts in Anglo-American Legal Reasoning 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p 102. 
56 Eg, J Gordley, Foundations of Private Law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), p 205.  
57 GL Priest, ‘The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern 
Tort Law’ (1985) 14 J Legal Stud 461. It is the ‘most influential’ theory of vicarious liability: D Tan, ‘Taking two 
bites at the cherry: vicarious liability and non-delegable duty’ (2018) 134 LQR 193, 195. 
58 Eg, Keating, above n30, pp 1273 and 1330. 
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levels of activity are undertaken;59 and the deterrence of future wrongdoing.60 Courts have 
not explored these different sub-goals in any depth – although they have tended to adopt the 
deterrence view. Indeed, until recently, courts had not even considered what an ‘enterprise’ 
is, fostering uncertainty about vicarious/enterprise liability’s scope and explanatory power.61  
 
These concerns aside, enterprise liability suffers from two flaws that undercut its 
justificatory power and call for a new model of organisational vicarious liability. The first flaw 
arises from its inability to encompass organisations that do not operate pursuant to ordinary 
profit motives. While the owners and managers of businesses operated for profit derive 
personal benefits from imposing risks on others,62 this is not the case with non-profit bodies. 
Those in charge of government departments, public authorities, and charities are ‘other-
regarding’, and have as their primary concern the needs of third parties.63 The ‘benefits’ of 
risk imposition arising from their activities accrue to third parties and not to those in charge.64 
So, whereas the imposition of risk-for-profit at the heart of enterprise liability has an 
exploitative quality to it, this does not characterise the activities of non-profits. The second 
flaw is that enterprise liability is not treated always as a theory directed towards reform of 
organisational activity. Indeed, some see it as little more than a ‘licence fee’ on activities 
                                                     
59 Eg, GC Keating, ‘The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability’ (2001) 54 Vand LR 1285, 
1286.  
60 See, eg, Kornhauser, above n32, pp 1346 and 1349-50.  
61 J Morgan, ‘Vicarious liability for independent contractors?’ [2015] PN 235, 241.  
62 N Mendelson, ‘A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts’ (2002) 102 Colum LR 
1203, 1253ff.  
63 EW Orts, Business Persons: A Legal Theory of the Firm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p 205. 
64 Eg, E v English Province of Our Lady of Charity [2013] QB 722, [109]; Cf D Tan, ‘Internalising Externalities: An 
Enterprise Risk Approach to Vicarious Liability in the 21st Century’ (2015) SAcLJ 822, 841 
 15 
which, although desirable, cause occasional injuries.65 This treats worker wrongdoing as a 
matter of indifference.66   
 
The best that we can say about enterprise liability is that it looks in the right direction 
by providing an explanation of vicarious liability that is not reliant upon agency, but which 
takes into account the organisational status of defendants and provides support for the 
imposition of liability upon profit-making businesses. However, initial steps have been taken 
towards identifying a more comprehensive theory. Stone adverted to important internal 
features of large business organisations by describing them as ‘bureaucracies’, characterised 
by information flows, managerial control, and the ability to plan for the future. In an 
increasingly bureaucratic world, wrongdoing was attributable to ‘flaws in the organization’s 
formal and informal authority structure, or in its information pathways’.67 A potential solution 
was to impose ‘direct and selective constraints on how … managers work out various internal 
relationships’.68 In another take on these issues, Deakin predicted that the ‘fragmentation of 
enterprise’ through practices such as out-sourcing would entail a move towards 
‘organisational liability’.69 He wrote also about organisational amenability to deterrence 
incentives and about the exercise of ‘managerial control’ to reduce risks.70  These writings 
                                                     
65 Goldberg and Zipursky, above n4, pp 763-4. 
66 A step not yet taken in the literature.  
67 C Stone, ‘The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct’ (1980) 90 Yale LJ 1, 5-6, 8 and 
31. 
68 Ibid p 8. 
69 S Deakin, ‘“Enterprise-Risk”: The Juridical Nature of the Firm Revisited’ (2003) 32 Ind LJ 97, 97.  
70 Ibid p 101. 
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provide helpful insights into what a theory of organisational vicarious liability ought to look 
like. 
 
5. ORGANISATIONAL VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
For present purposes, it is best to consider the justification of vicarious liability in medium- 
and large-size organisations by taking an initial step back from these theoretical prompts in 
order to consider first principles. The standard judicial refrain is that tort law (taken as a 
whole) has the twin aims of compensating tort victims and deterring future wrongdoing.71 
Vicarious liability fulfils the compensatory aim in an uncomplicated way. As for deterrence, 
the assumption is that rules of law have a positive effect on behaviour. They are predicated 
on legal subjects having knowledge of the rules and of the consequences of breaching them. 
In tort law, the deterrence argument appears to be soundest with respect to torts that 
provide explicit definitions of wrongdoing, such as battery and assault. This is because tort 
rules of this nature perform a guidance function.72 The deterrence argument appears sound, 
also, with respect to negligence because courts spell out precautions for particular types of 
risk-taking. But what about vicarious liability, which is a rule of strict liability? Here the 
deterrence justification presents a puzzle because, in determining cases, courts do not 
formulate specific behavioural guidelines or precautions to be taken. All that they do is to 
state that, if a worker commits a tort in the field of employer-assigned activities, the employer 
will be held strictly liable for sufficiently-connected harms to third parties. Can such a rule 
deter wrongdoing?  
                                                     
71 Eg, Michael v Chief Commissioner of South Wales Police [2015] AC 1732, [127].  
72 P Cane, Key Ideas in Tort Law (Oxford: Hart, 2017), p 2.  
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Organisational vicarious liability embodies a form of ‘mediated deterrence’ because 
the organisation is made responsible for altering the behaviour of its workers.73 The idea to 
be tested is that this is a cogent practice because organisations are ‘deterrable’ parties, 
vicarious liability being a means of inducing from them the development of proper standards 
of worker conduct. This might occur through: specific deterrence, pursuant to which 
organisations that have had vicarious liability awards made against them take action to 
prevent the future commission of torts; and/or general deterrence, whereby vicarious liability 
awards impact upon organisations more generally because they either fear future claims or 
want, simply, to be good corporate citizens.74 Being of a forward-looking nature, vicarious 
liability arises irrespective of whether organisations actually take sufficient care. By 
eliminating any no-fault escape route, the doctrine creates on-going incentives for 
organisations to prevent the commission of worker wrongs.  
 
In modelling the deterrable organisation, three foundational themes require 
exploration. These concern strict liability, the delegation of standard-setting that occurs 
under strict liability, and the nature of organisation. After exploring these themes, the article 
examines empirical evidence on deterrence and assesses the ‘blockages’ that could frustrate 
its goals.  
 
(a) Strict liability 
                                                     
73 M Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons and Organizations (New Orleans: Quid Pro Quo, 2nd edn, 2016), p 106. 
74 See, eg, Friedman, above n5, p 97; Hodges, above n24, p 48.  
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Ever since courts eschewed actual authorisation of tortious acts as a necessary predicate to 
vicarious liability, the doctrine has been one of strict liability. This has been a source of 
difficulty for theorists who believe that modern tort law is grounded in, and justified by 
reference to, fault.75 In order better to understand the nature and effect of vicarious liability, 
it is important to explore what strict liability entails. Typical statements include Lord 
Hobhouse’s declaration in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd that vicarious liability is ‘strict’ because 
‘there has been no actual fault on the part of the employers’,76 and Lord Nicholls’ averment 
in Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam that ‘[v]icarious liability involves the notion that, vis-à-
vis third parties, the employer, although personally blameless,… is liable for the fault of 
another’.77 Such statements cannot mean that vicarious liability arises only in cases of 
blameless employers. Indeed, contrary to what some judges and commentators assume, 
strict liability is not liability in the absence of fault. It is ‘liability regardless of whether the 
defendant engaged in conduct that breached a legally specified standard’.78 Under strict 
liability, the court does not inquire into fault because this is unnecessary.79 The vicariously 
liable employer’s conduct might have been ‘innocent’, but that is not inevitable – as was 
acknowledged in Bernard v Attorney General of Jamaica, where Lord Steyn observed that 
there will ‘be cases of vicarious liability where employers were at fault’.80 Indeed, Abraham 
                                                     
75 Eg, Gray, above n12. 
76 [2002] 1 AC 215, [55] (emphasis in original). 
77 [2002] 2 AC 366, [47]. 
78 Cane, above n3, p 82 (emphasis added); T Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (Oxford: Hart, 1999), p 23. 
79 F James, ‘Vicarious Liability’ (1954) 28 Tulane LR 161, 166. 
80 [2005] IRLR 398, [21].  
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asserts that vicarious liability is imposed on some types of defendant as a surrogate for 
findings of expected negligence.81  
 
One of the primary reasons for the attractiveness of vicarious liability is that it 
removes the need to prove fault.82 This is helpful especially when defendants are complex 
organisations and claimants have no knowledge of their internal workings. Worker negligence 
typically involve a combination of individual slips, latent conditions, and local factors.83 Latent 
conditions frequently result from senior management decisions,84 but it can be difficult to 
obtain evidence of fault at this level of decision-making. Indeed, whether torts committed are 
accidental or intentional, it might be difficult for claimants to access information about ‘what 
went wrong’85 because organisations refuse to cooperate or because it is difficult to extract 
salient features from the evidence. Where professional assistance is required to construct a 
case of organisational fault, this is likely to be costly for claimants. 
 
Where evidence of what went wrong is available, there is still another step that a court 
must take in deciding whether an organisation was at fault. This is to specify the appropriate 
standard of care that should have been observed and to determine whether the defendant’s 
conduct fell below it. In straightforward cases (even those involving vicarious liability86), 
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courts specify precautions that should have been taken. But this becomes more difficult as 
organisations become more bureaucratic. As such, another reason for imposing strict liability 
is that it places an onus upon organisations to do all that they can to promote proper 
standards of conduct and prevent worker wrongdoing.87 This is more likely to be an effective 
strategy when organisations understand that they inevitably will be made liable for the 
consequences of worker wrongdoing.88 Fixing them with responsibility should result in either 
lower activity levels89 or more effective precaution-taking.90 As to the latter, vicarious liability 
‘focuses energies on prevention, on systematic and proactive efforts rather than discrete 
reactions to specific known instances of misconduct…’.91 
 
(b) Co-option/delegation 
Whereas fault-based rules require that claimants obtain information about the internal 
workings of organisations and ways of addressing risks, strict liability makes this irrelevant. 
Under vicarious liability, responsibility for standard-setting is ‘delegated’ to organisations 
themselves.92 If organisations want to avoid liability, the onus is upon them to take action. 
‘[A] strict liability standard [overcomes] the information asymmetry problem. With a strict 
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liability standard, only the … firm need know what the [necessary] level of care is and whether 
the firm has met it’.93  
 
The cogency of delegation becomes apparent upon consideration of the parallels between 
it and modern regulatory practice. The context is one of a society characterised by 
‘coordination problems’,94 which arise because persons live and work together in close 
cooperation. This entails a high degree of interdependence within workplaces and wider 
communities. Interactions in these settings present significant risks of harm-doing, and a basic 
function of tort law is to stimulate the development of standards of conduct that mitigate 
risks.95 Many view the ‘organisational transformation of society’ as presenting an appropriate 
means of doing this.96 Indeed, a ‘decision concerning an organisation is … more likely than 
one pertaining to an individual to reverberate through the system, affecting in various ways 
other organisations and, through them, multitudes of individuals’.97 Medium- and large-size 
organisations have important capacities for planning and coordinating the work of large 
numbers of people, and conduct operations on a recurring basis.98 Tort suits against them 
become ‘occasions for judges … to regulate behaviour on a forward-looking basis’, thus 
making tort law an ‘important component of the … administrative state’.99  
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The goals of regulation are similar in many ways, encompassing the proper understanding 
of risks of activity,100 forward planning, and the formulation of general standards of 
conduct.101 Formerly, regulation was conceived of as involving vertical relationships between 
regulatory agencies and subjects of regulation under the ‘command-and-control’ model. This 
model features legislation either prohibiting conduct outright or formulating standards for its 
occurrence, inspections by regulatory agencies which enforce standards through 
prosecutions and civil suits, and the drawing up of schedules of penalties for non-
compliance.102 The effectiveness of the command-and-control model has declined in a world 
of fast-changing markets,103 high volumes of manufacture, distribution and transacting,104 
faltering regulatory agency expertise, and limited enforcement budgets.105 Without the 
adoption of innovative methods of regulation, there would be large gaps in standard-setting. 
‘In many cases, therefore, the regulatory choice is … whether to prevent a given activity 
entirely … or to rely upon market participants to set appropriate standards through the 
decisions they make in seeking to act in accordance with regulatory principles or rules’.106 
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Modern, decentered approaches to regulation involve governmental and non-
governmental actors operating at different levels, many standards being determined either 
by industry associations adopting codes of conduct or by individual organisations taking a 
systems approach to risk management107 and devising relevant policies and procedures.108 
Direct state intervention occurs only when private actors fail to comply with their own 
standards.109 For this reason, much of the ‘governance that shapes the daily lives of most 
citizens today is corporate governance [rather] than state governance’.110 This institutional 
arrangement complements tort law’s pursuit of deterrence goals. Almost all medium- and 
large-size organisations are subject to elements of decentred regulation and have systems of 
standard-setting in place.111 It is to these same systems and people – management, 
compliance personnel, lawyers and employees – that organisations turn in order to prevent 
worker torts. Their ‘internal monitoring capacities and sanctioning resources are harnessed 
on behalf of external control’.112 
 
(c) Organisation 
We move on now to the last of our themes exploring organisational deterrence. According to 
the model under consideration, medium- and large-size organisations are ‘deterrable’ 
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because they have advanced capacities to respond to tort law’s demands and to implement 
appropriate standards of conduct. Discussion will focus here upon medium-size companies 
(MSCs) because they are representative of vicarious liability defendants. Let us hypothesise 
an MSC manufacturing several products, which has a few hundred employees whose work is 
coordinated through its managerial structure. The MSC operates in a network of companies, 
each of which specialises in activities along the chain of manufacture and distribution. At first, 
we assume the MSC to be a ‘high reliability organisation’ (HRO), which is self-reflective, 
always considering how best to respond to risks.113 Later, in testing the durability of our 
model, we will relax this assumption.  
 
Rational subjects of the law strive to adhere to legal rules on account of their law-
abiding character and desire to do the right thing.114 They are likely to be wary of the criminal 
law, with its prohibitions designed to protect important public interests. It would be hoped 
that they would pay just as much heed to tort rules. But the lesser stigma attached to tort 
liability might mean that profit-oriented companies pay heed to vicarious liability judgments 
only if doing so is ‘good for business’. Indeed, we shall make this assumption of our otherwise 
high reliability MSC115 in order better to test the strength of the deterrability argument. Even 
under this assumption, constructive responses to vicarious liability judgments should be 
expected because they are rational and good for business. The company will want to avoid 
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regulatory concerns, contain its financial liabilities, preserve its reputation, and focus upon 
core business issues.116  
 
The discussion proceeds by considering actions that should take place after a 
judgment has been given holding an MSC vicariously liable for the commission of a tort. Each 
of the major steps in the journey from judgment to prevention of future wrongdoing is 
examined. The focus is upon specific deterrence. According to Hodges, a ‘prerequisite for a 
deterrent effect is that actors must … have the capacity to anticipate that certain actions will 
cause harm and the potential for liability, and be able to take steps to avoid that harm’.117 We 
will see that the deterrable organisation model suggests that deterrence results from the 
forward-looking nature of organisational decision-making,118 the structures through which 
decisions are implemented, managerial ability to compel workers to comply with decisions, 
and the ability to formulate norms of behavior for workers under organisational control.  
 
(i) RECEIPT OF JUDGMENT AND SENSE-MAKING 
The immediate significance of a vicarious liability judgment will depend upon various factors, 
including the award’s size and expected operational impact.119 Large awards have the 
potential to raise alarm bells, but so too do modest awards which portend a wide sphere of 
liability. In the case of large awards, senior management is likely to order a review of the 
company’s liability position as part of its risk planning process, an investigation of fault, and 
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the drawing up of reform plans.120 Less significant awards will be handled, initially, by in-
house lawyers and/or the regulatory compliance team.121 They will construe the judgment122 
and prepare advice about what it entails for the company’s compliance officers and middle-
managers.123 In both scenarios, a liability award acts as a ‘disturbing event’ which serves to 
alert the company to the existence of a dysfunction, which triggers its ‘standard operating 
procedures’124 and initiates a process of deterrence. 
 
(ii) INVESTIGATING FAULT AND RESPONSIBILITY 
When a court finds fault in a company, often this will indicate the need for changes to business 
practices. As such, a norm or standard will be formulated for future action. The company’s 
lawyers/compliance team will inform middle-managers of the need for adherence to the new 
norm. In the typical case of vicarious liability, where an award of compensation is made 
without enquiry into fault,125 an investigation by the company might be warranted in order 
to determine what went wrong. This might be conducted, in the case of intentional 
misconduct, by lawyers, compliance officers, and/or human resources personnel, and, in the 
case of accidents, by compliance officers and/or health and safety representatives. Unions 
might become involved.126 Properly-trained investigators will consider whether the 
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conditions that led to wrongdoing are systemic and likely to repeat themselves. Where 
repetition is likely, the organisational response might entail alterations to structures, systems, 
and processes.  
 
(iii) ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING AND CHANGE 
Company investigations into systemic problems and/or individual fault connote a learning 
process. The company seeks to educate itself about what has gone wrong so as to avoid future 
problems. Most MSCs are organised into functional units such as senior management, 
research and product development, production, marketing, and sales.127  Specialisation of 
function in each unit usually ensures high technical expertise and substantial operational 
experience. A significant proportion of decision-making powers are delegated from senior 
management to middle managers.128 Middle managers have oversight of limited numbers of 
individuals, and their main responsibility is to coordinate work.129 But they have an implicit 
obligation also to ensure that operations evolve as the business environment changes. This 
means being open to innovation and doing things differently. Success brings greater resource 
to the unit. Indeed, managers who are able to improve performance will be rewarded 
personally. As such, they should have a natural incentive to formulate solutions to the 
problems which vicarious liability judgments signal. The experience of dealing with problems 
becomes part of corporate memory. Lessons learned are recorded in policies and operational 
manuals and/or invoked in training programmes.130 
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(iv) FORMULATION OF A RESPONSE 
Typically, the formulation of responses to legal problems involves identifying potential 
solutions, evaluating them, and choosing one for managerial authorisation.131 The ability to 
implement initiatives applicable to large groups of people is where organisations excel. 
Organisations restrain, direct, and control the actions of workers through rules, policies, 
processes, supervision, reporting, training, and culture.132 These ‘integration mechanisms’ are 
designed to orient action towards company goals, to limit individual discretion, and to embed 
standards of interaction. These standards promote the coordination of activity in order to 
achieve unity of effort and efficiencies in worker interactions.133 As such, organisations 
operate as ‘regulative frameworks’.134  
 
Embedded standards of interaction are prominent especially in manufacturing and 
other sectors that require operational precision.135 They are less prominent in the services 
sector and in industries undergoing rapid change, where less-structured operations prevail, 
decision-making authority is pushed down to those most informed of local conditions,136 and 
coordination is achieved through informal processes of ‘mutual adjustment’.137 However, 
even in these organisations some operational issues remain under senior management 
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control138 – especially as regards compliance with criminal law, governmental regulation, and 
health and safety standards. HROs frequently take a prescriptive approach, in order to meet 
regulatory requirements, and establish clear worker responsibilities. 
 
Fisse and Braithwaite believe that ‘it is possible for corporations to be held to different 
and higher standards of responsibility than individuals because of their … capacity as 
organisations’.139 They have the ability to use integration mechanisms not only to promote 
workplace efficiency, but to reduce areas of individual discretion and prevent the commission 
of torts. Specific actions they might take in response to vicarious liability judgments include:  
 
• Changes in rules and procedures: Senior management must design systems to counter 
inevitable human errors as well as person-specific behavioural tendencies spanning from 
laziness to predatory sexual conduct.140 In cases where individual workers transgress and 
commit torts, senior management should ensure the existence of an effective system of 
internal discipline.141 Disciplining workers is a necessary concomitant of the company’s 
establishment and promotion of norms of conduct.142 While it is not possible always to 
prevent wrongdoing, the mere fact that the company will pay for worker wrongs provides on-
going incentives to try. 
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• Changes in personnel etc: The success of a company depends on hiring staff with 
appropriate skills and aptitudes and screening out those with unwanted traits. Many 
developments in vicarious liability have taken place in the context of the sexual abuse of 
children. Here we must digress from our manufacturing MSC in order to consider what the 
deterrable organisation model says about problems arising in schools and childcare 
organisations. Workers who commit abuse conceal their misdeeds, making it difficult to take 
action against them. Yet courts insist that organisations have a key role to play in preventing 
abuse. Precautions include background checks, psychological testing, implementation of 
formal procedures for undertaking risky activities, monitoring of workers, checks on 
vulnerable children, procedures for making complaints and investigating them, warnings and 
other kinds of reproach, transfer or removal from places of work, and dismissal.  
 
• Changes in lines of accountability: The company should be able effectively to monitor 
middle-managers with delegated powers and operations managers responsible for risky 
processes and the conduct of individuals.143 In the case of simple physical processes, 
managers supervise personnel directly. In cases involving more sophisticated ways of 
working, there might be a need to educate and train workers, to introduce improved 
procedures, and/or reporting. Evidence suggests that, frequently, knowledge of gaps in safety 
standards and other problems is present before wrongs occur, but that it fails to make its way 
to managers.144 This emphasises the importance of proper internal disclosure and 
accountability systems by which information makes its way from worksites to managers.   
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• Changes in incentive systems: Although this paper is written from an organisational/systems 
perspective, it is notable that economic analysts of law pay considerable attention to the use 
of incentives within organisations. They argue that strict liability is the best mechanism for 
inducing efficient levels of risky activity because it ensures that all costs of activity are 
absorbed by the relevant ‘enterprise’.145 Enterprises will want to avoid risky activities that are 
unprofitable. Beyond this, the ‘employer’s influence over advancement and compensation 
decisions provides an[ ] important incentive device… [A]s long as the employee values the 
employment relationship, these incentives can act as an effective constraint’ upon employee 
behaviour.146  
 
• Organisational culture: In addition to the creation of formal standards and the operation of 
group dynamics, organisations seek positively to influence worker conduct through 
‘organisational culture’. A strong culture ensures that managers and workers are ‘on the same 
wavelength’. It subsists in shared values and understandings transmitted through recruitment 
and training as well as socialisation processes, including job rotation, social events, and casual 
conversations.147 ‘[O]nce internalized, implicit understandings direct and coordinate 
employees’ behavior and cause them to internally monitor their own behavior and that of 
others’.148 In this way, organisational culture reinforces perceptions that participants are 
pursuing common goals, which encourages them to adhere to rules and procedures, and 
strengthens group dynamics.  
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• Changes in industry partnerships: Often companies work in networks,149 which are contract-
based agreements for the supply of goods and services. These arrangements might be 
implemented for reasons related to the availability of know-how and/or efficiency of 
operations. Sometimes, however, the motivation for entering into network agreements is to 
escape responsibility for employment obligations and this ‘benefit’ has resulted in 
widespread outsourcing and offshoring. Despite the contractual nature of networking 
agreements, an MSC might be in ‘control’ of industry partners dependent on it for business.150 
It might be able to influence standards adopted by network partners through contracting and 
supervision processes.151 Widening the net of vicarious liability so as to include some 
responsibility for the torts of independent contractors could lead to changes in contracting 
relationships which improve standards and reduce worker wrongdoing.  
 
(v) INTERNAL TRANSMISSION: MANAGERIAL AUTHORITY 
A chart of managerial responsibility outlines where individuals are placed within the MSC’s 
decision-making and command structure.152 Decisions run down the chain of command, 
creating a managerial ability not only to coordinate action but to impose decisions upon the 
unwilling. Assuming that senior management desires change, it can achieve this by using its 
authority to alter rules, policies, processes, and so on.153 In the usual case, there is no need 
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to exercise authority in a heavy-handed way because subordinates understand that they 
cannot make their own, personal choices, and must comply with management initiatives.154 
Indeed, a positive organisational culture will smooth the way to compliance. In our 
hypothetical MSC, the Chief Executive Officer and board of directors are at the managerial 
apex. They set the company’s policy direction with the advice of senior managers, experts, 
and technicians. Given that our MSC manufactures several products, it is likely to have 
multiple functional units that align product-types and markets.155 The middle-managers 
leading these units will adopt the integration mechanisms best suited to achieve change 
and/or reduce individual worker discretion.156  
 
(vi) EXTERNAL TRANMISSIONS: REPUTATION AND MIMICRY 
Even beyond ‘general deterrence’, change within one organisation has the potential to spur 
changes in others157 because they are ‘nested’ within society and experience pressures to 
conform to best practice. Best practice is disseminated through various channels, including 
professional/trade association guidelines,158 insurer initiatives, publicity, movement of staff, 
and so on.159 Scott found these mimetic processes in operation after alterations to equal 
opportunity and medical malpractice laws.160 Change rippled through organisations as 
managers and others sought to make sense of new laws and engaged in problem-solving 
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activities that influenced whole organisational fields.161 This demonstrates the potential in a 
corporatised world for judicial signals to initiate wide change. 
 
(vii) RELAXING THE HIGH-RELIABILITY ASSUMPTION 
We have now considered the steps that the ideal, profit-focussed MSC should take in 
response to a vicarious liability judgment. As stated, the ideal is an HRO, which is self-
reflective, always considering how best to respond to risks. But not all companies are HROs. 
As such, we should relax this assumption now and consider where gaps might arise in 
processes of organisational deterrence. We commence with some observations about the 
reality of deterrence. Judicial belief in the possibility of deterrence is a product of judges’ 
‘internal’ views that laws help guide future conduct. In cases where persons fail to observe 
tort rules, they are subject to penalties that include injunctions and damages awards. The 
threat of liability ought to bring about changes in behaviour. But there is an on-going debate 
about the empirical validity of the idea that tort deters. 
 
Opportunities for deterrence are influenced by both the type of tort (doctrine) in issue 
and the type of defendant. As noted, some torts offer more guidance than others. Definitional 
torts are more helpful than is negligence. Furthermore, it would appear that industrial and 
other recurring activities are more amenable to deterrence because defects usually are 
capable of ‘technical’ fixes. By contrast, the activities of sexual predators are problematic, 
given the vagaries of individual preferences and motivations to act.162 Yet, tort law does not 
operate in a vacuum. It is one of a range of mechanisms by which the state seeks to shape 
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conduct. Tort law has a role in reinforcing the criminal and regulatory law and can make a 
difference to outcomes – given the ways in which organisations, such as schools and councils 
arranging foster care, can act to prevent abuse, and given anecdotal evidence of the ways in 
which they have reacted to liability ‘scares’ in the past.  
 
Again, tort law’s efficacy as a deterrent will depend upon who the defendants are. 
Individuals are prone to indiscretions and lapses that cannot be eliminated completely. 
Organisations and professional persons are more likely to act in rational ways163 and should 
be more easily deterred by tort rules.164 They have access to legal advice, professional 
association guidance (in some cases, mandatory standards are imposed),165 and training 
opportunities. Indeed, it would appear that most employer organisations know of their 
vicarious liability for worker wrongs.166 Greater difficulty might lie in ascertaining the details 
of the torts for which they could be held liable. But even here, they would have a reasonable 
understanding that worker activities that endanger safety and wellbeing can be subject to 
claims. And organisations have the capacity to bring about changes in worker behaviour.  
 
But what does the evidence tell us about the reality of deterrence? The evidence is 
not entirely helpful. Many shortcomings boil down to a lack of meaningful data, to the 
operation of overlapping rules in criminal, regulatory and and tort law, and to problems in 
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proving relationships of cause (rule or no rule) and effect (wrong or no wrong).167 In this way, 
testing of hypotheses about deterrence must be undertaken by using surrogate 
experimentation. ‘Evidence’ from surrogate testing is tentative, open to refutation, and 
frequently unreliable. Having said as much, the evidence from meta-studies is that 
regulatory/tort law does deter, if only modestly,168 and that the effect is greatest upon 
governmental agencies169 and larger companies.170 Moreover, deterrence is more likely to be 
realised with respect to organisations that have been subject to legal actions themselves 
(specific deterrence) than with respect to those that simply learn from the experience of 
others (general deterrence).171 Larger companies especially are compliant with 
regulatory/tort norms because they: are monitored internally through corporate governance 
arrangements and in-house compliance units172 and externally by stakeholders such as credit-
rating agencies and corporate advisory firms;173 have a community ‘presence’ and must be 
mindful of their reputations;174 and have the financial wherewithal to implement good norms 
of conduct.175 Small companies are less likely to be deterred because of their lack of 
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knowledge of what the law requires,176 lower financial margins,177 and tendency to do the 
minimum necessary to comply with legal obligations.178  
 
These findings support the viability of the deterrable organisation model, which 
concentrates upon ‘bureaucratic’ middle- and large-size entities. But this is not to say that 
deterrence processes are as effective as the model would assume. What are the problems? 
We consider here the potential ‘bottlenecks’ and ‘choke points’ in organisational responses 
to vicarious liability awards.179  Responses to deterrence imperatives might be compromised 
by one or more of the following problems: 
 
• Senior managers do not always have either the time or ability to focus upon all operational 
issues. They must set priorities, as must other organisational personnel, so that responding 
to vicarious liability judgments might not be treated as especially important;180  
 
• Senior managers who accept the need for reform might determine that the costs of change 
will be high and that no commitment should be made to it either because resources are not 
available, or because alternative ‘business cases’ for the use of funds are more attractive. This 
type of problem will be acute among organisations in the vicinity of insolvency;181 
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• Even if adequate resources are available, organisational staff might not have information 
required for good decision-making. They might be unable to make sense of vicarious liability 
judgments or analyse adequately problems affecting their organisations. Indeed, Simon 
believed such problems to be endemic, leading to his insight that decision-makers suffer from 
‘bounded rationality’. However, he believed also that organisations can overcome individual 
shortcomings;182  
 
• Even where correct prognoses are made in response to vicarious liability judgments, the 
forces of inertia might be strong. These might be grounded, for example, in established 
practices or vested interests;183 and 
 
• Organisations might try to dodge responsibility for torts by outsourcing work.184 The recent 
widening of vicarious liability so as to create liability for the torts of non-employees – who 
might be independent contractors185 – is likely to reduce this temptation.  
 
These bottlenecks and choke points need to be addressed and something more will be said 
about this issue momentarily. But before doing so, we should deal briefly with another 
objection to deterrence reasoning, which is that insurance ‘cushions’ tort’s deterrent 
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effect.186 Several responses can be made to this claim. First, following a government austerity 
drive, many public authorities and state-owned enterprises have reduced their reliance upon 
commercial insurance and/or have become self-insurers.187 Second, many companies are 
insured by ‘captive insurers’ in the same corporate group, these groups being ‘self-
insurers’.188 Third, organisations with commercial insurance have many reasons to be 
concerned about their exposure to tort liabilities. Insurers might insist upon risk-management 
regimes or monitor their conduct.189 Their agreements with assureds impose obligations of 
care.190 Excess clauses operate to align the interests of insurers and assureds,191 insured 
amounts being subject to claims limits so that there is a risk that assureds will need to make 
contributions, and employers found vicariously liable for the commission of torts face 
reputational damage in the eyes of employees and customers.192 Fourth, insurers undertake 
educative functions to increase standards of safety, health, and so on, and to reduce the 
number of claims made. For these reasons, the supposed ‘cushioning’ effect of insurance is 
over-played and cannot be equated with a smothering of deterrence.  
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6. PRESCRIPTIONS 
There is always ‘slippage’ in the space between law and compliance. Even so, findings from 
the empirical literature on deterrence suggest that the deterrable organisation model is likely 
to need bolstering in order to ensure that organisations take effective action to prevent the 
commission of worker wrongs. Here we move from the interpretive stage of our 
consideration of vicarious liability to the post-interpretive stage. This means making 
prescriptions for improvements to legal practices.  
 
A first prescription affirms the wisdom of widening the net of vicarious liability so as 
to encompass some non-employees. This ought to be encouraged because it is likely to lead 
to a renewed sense of responsibility in organisations for wrongdoing which occurs in 
connection to their activities. Indeed, Arlen and McLeod argue in favour of extending 
vicarious liability to independent contractors in order to avoid the inherent subsidy which 
arises when organisations use thinly-capitalised independent contractors to undertake risky 
work. Such independent contractors operate on the premise of low expected tort liabilities 
(‘low’ because they will be unable to pay more than nominal sums), which enables them to 
charge less for their work.193 This leads to moral hazard and excessive risk-creation. Arlen and 
McLeod’s analysis supports ‘expanding the reach of entity-level liability to certain 
organisations which hire independent contractors’.194 The key issue in the imposition of 
vicarious liability is whether ‘an organisation could have structured its relationship with the 
agent to allow it to influence the agent’s behaviour’.195 Naturally enough, courts must not go 
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too far in diverting responsibility from independent contractors to deterrable organisations 
for fear that this would dissuade the latter from using outside experts when necessary196 or 
that it would create responsibility where control could not be exercised over independent 
contractor activities.197 
 
The second prescription entails use of the right remedies so that deterrence outcomes 
are maximised. Here we need to keep in mind the fact that vicarious liability is not liability 
without fault and that it might function as a proxy for fault. This justifies the use of remedies 
designed to bring about reform of conduct. Existing rules on damages can facilitate this, 
although there is a question about their efficacy. Where worker conduct is egregious and 
exemplary damages are awarded in order to punish and deter, the vicariously liable employer 
must pay the full award.198 The size of the award will be calculated according to the resources 
available to the employer rather than to the tortfeasor.199 This could result in very high awards 
in sexual abuse cases and bring tort law into line with the criminal law in terms of its deterrent 
potential. Moreover, where the employer is made liable in successive cases of vicarious 
liability, this creates an opportunity for future claimants to plead systemic negligence against 
the organisation itself – meaning that claimants are able to plead the commission of torts by 
both workers and organisation.  
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Beyond the ability to order payment of damages, the English High Court has several 
powers that could help to bring about reform of organisations and of worker conduct, 
including powers to issue injunctions200 and to make declarations. An action for vicarious 
liability might support the award of a prohibitory injunction against an organisation aimed at 
preventing the commission of future wrongs. In cases where the evidence adduced reveals 
lapses in organisational structures and practices, courts might be prepared to go further and 
grant mandatory injunctions directing organisations to carry out reforms. But courts will do 
so only when their terms can be made certain enough.201 It is likely that courts would be 
readier to grant declaratory relief pursuant to their inherent jurisdiction,202 framed in terms 
of the need for investigation of structures and practices and for reform.203 The main limit to 
the grant of declaratory relief is that it must serve a real purpose in ordering legal relations 
between parties204 – which, in the present context, does not present a high hurdle.  
 
At the moment, injunctions and declarations are used infrequently in vicarious liability 
cases. It might be necessary to consider further ways in which remedies could be structured 
so as to induce reform and to insist upon follow up, for example through progress reporting. 
This idea would cohere with developments in the criminal law, where there has been 
movement towards use of non-monetary orders against organisations so as to bring about 
their rehabilitation. US prosecutors make use of deferred prosecution agreements in order to 
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induce ‘structural change’. ‘Managers can be fired, new leadership can adopt compliance 
programs and governance reforms, and independent monitors can review changes to policies 
and practices’.205 Deferred prosecution agreement orders can be made in the UK too, for the 
purposes of implementing a compliance programme or making changes to an existing 
compliance programme relating to an organisation’s policies or to the training of their 
employees.206 Similar methods of bringing about change have been used occasionally in civil 
law, although normally at the behest of government agencies enforcing regulatory standards. 
For example, in In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon”,207 the US District Court made 
consent orders aimed at improvement of safety practices, contractor oversight, corporate 
governance, senior manager training, internal auditing of compliance, and external 
monitoring of activities. However, such orders are possible only when there is evidence of 
failures in organisational systems and, in the absence of actions based on systemic negligence, 
this might require the development of a power in courts to order preliminary investigations 
into such matters.  
 
Experience from regulatory law suggests that court orders specifying the need for 
investigations into their structures and/or for changed practices must be subject to follow-
up.208 Mechanisms could be put in place to ensure monitoring of investigations and/or 
changes being implemented, which would not require the constant involvement of courts. 
Instead, these might involve court-appointed experts209 or task forces of organisational 
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personnel.210 In other cases, it might be appropriate for claimants to seek undertakings by 
companies and/or their directors that they will reform relevant operations and to either 
publicise measures taken or file reports in court. In the latter case, reports filed in court could 
be retained as records that could prove important in the future should there be further 
transgressions, facilitating arguments of systemic negligence.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Much of the classical case law on vicarious liability can be justified on the basis of liberal 
agency. This justification applies to cases in which owner-managers have personal relations 
with wrongdoing workers. Typically, such relations are found among small companies, small 
partnerships, and individual employers. However, agency is a less cogent justification in 
bureaucratic organisations, in which there are multiple levels of decision-making, indirect 
communications to workers, and significant areas of individual discretion.  
 
Courts have begun to offer new justifications for the imposition of vicarious liability 
which are relevant especially to medium- and large-size organisations. This article assembled 
elements of the reasoning used in cases involving such organisations and used them to 
construct a model of vicarious liability – the model of the ‘deterrable organisation’. The 
‘deterrability’ of bureaucratic organisations was seen to reside in their structures and 
processes, which can be utilised in imposing norms of good conduct upon workers. The 
‘delegation’ by courts of responsibility for imposing standards upon workers to organisations 
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themselves coheres with modern notions of decentred regulation – and makes use of the 
same structures, processes, and personnel.  
 
The organisational deterrence justification of vicarious liability does not preclude 
reliance upon notions of liberal agency where this is evident in bureaucratic organisations – 
these are mutually supportive justifications for the imposition of vicarious liability upon 
organisations. What matters is that, for each case of vicarious liability, one or both of the 
justifications applies so as to signify the appropriateness of the defendant’s liability. The 
deterrable organisation model fills a gap in justifying vicarious liability in non-agency cases. 
 
Finally, the article reflected upon evidence about the reality of deterrence involving 
bureaucratic organisations. It was seen that scholars have greater faith in deterrence 
processes involving such organisations than they have in those involving individuals. Even so, 
the deterrence potential of vicarious liability could be strengthened by courts doing such 
things as making greater use of exemplary damages and of non-monetary orders aimed at 
bringing about organisational reform.  
